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Abstract
In their editorial, Mannion and Braithwaite contend that the approach to solving the problem of unsafe care, 
Safety I, is flawed and requires a shift in thinking to what they are calling Safety II. We have reservations as to 
whether by itself the shift from Safety I to Safety II is sufficient. Perhaps our failure to improve outcomes in 
the field of patient safety and quality lies less in our approach – Safety I vs. Safety II – and more in the lack of 
an agreed upon, commonly understood set of core competencies (knowledge, skills, and attitudes) needed in 
its workforce. The authors explore in this commentary the need to establish core competencies as part of the 
pathway to professionalism for the discipline of patient safety and quality.
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We read with great interest the provocative editorial by Mannion and Braithwaite, False Dawns and New Horizons in Patient Safety Research and 
Practice.1 In their article, the authors developed a sound 
argument underlying the intractability of improvements in 
patient safety. As many as one in ten patients is harmed by 
health-related care, indicating a principal problem within 
health systems around the globe.1,2 Mannion and Braithwaite 
contend that our past approach to solving the problem of 
unsafe care, Safety I, is fundamentally flawed, requiring a 
paradigm shift of thinking towards what they are calling 
Safety II. Safety I, the approach adopted by most healthcare 
systems worldwide, focuses on understanding why a patient 
safety event has occurred using standard approaches (eg, 
root cause analysis, incident reporting, failure modes and 
effects analysis) adapted for use in healthcare from other high 
reliability industries.1,3-5 Our concentration of resources on 
rare events, linear causality, and individual culpability has 
resulted in minimal gains towards building safer systems since 
the publication of To Err is Human launched the modern-day 
patient safety movement.6 The driving question is whether the 
Safety II approach will produce different results by combining 
Safety I thinking with examination of the how and why of 
safely delivered care? Or, alternatively, is Safety II yet another 
case of “work as imagined”?7
We have reservations as to whether by itself the shift from Safety 
I to Safety II is sufficient to disrupt the intractability in the 
fields of patient safety practice and research. The underlying 
hypothesis of Mannion and Braithwaite is predicated on the 
assumption that systems thinking is the pervasive approach 
to examining patient safety incidents and that Safety II builds 
upon the foundational competencies (knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes) developed through the systematic and routine 
application of the principles of Safety I. It is here that we pause 
and suggest that their hypothesis may not accurately reflect 
patient safety as practiced in most healthcare settings, or 
better said the “work as done.”7 We offer an alternative theory 
for consideration.
Patient Safety in Practice: A Well-Intentioned Workforce
Perhaps our failure to improve outcomes in the field of 
patient safety and quality lies less in our approach – Safety 
Ivs. Safety II – and more in the lack of an agreed upon, 
commonly understood set of core competencies (knowledge, 
skills, and attitudes) needed in its workforce. Those currently 
doing the work of patient safety and quality are formally 
trained in medicine, nursing, law, pharmacy, and healthcare 
administration, and not formally trained in the emerging 
profession of patient safety and quality itself. Before we decide 
“to throw the baby out with the bathwater,”8 perhaps we need 
to broaden our perspective on the problem. 
Our experience as patient safety scientists, educators, and 
practitioners has fostered an appreciation for the challenges 
faced by other patient safety practitioners at the sharp end of 
their work. What we have found is an incredibly dedicated 
and passionate group of individuals, drawn to solve the 
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problems in patient safety and quality, who come to the field 
from disparate professions, education, and training. Many 
patient safety practitioners lack the essential competencies 
(knowledge, skills, and attitudes) needed to further the 
modern-day patient safety agenda.9-12 As an example, one 
core competency to foster successful application of Safety I 
principles is the ability to conduct comprehensive, systems-
based, root cause analyses (RCA) and to develop and 
implement sustainable plans of action.9,12 A recent study 
examining 302 RCAs concluded that the proposed solutions 
resulting from the RCA were less likely to decrease event 
recurrence and less likely to recommend actions to improve 
the RCA processes and local implementation.13,14 Few leaders 
in quality and patient safety receive formal training to perform 
the technical work within the profession. We contend that 
these patient safety leaders, those responsible for conducting 
the technical work of patient safety, require formal education 
in the core competencies9,12 to perform the imagined work 
as designed to achieve the aims of Safety I. Until the field of 
patient safety unites around these competencies and requires 
certification as a profession, neither Safety I nor Safety II will 
reach its full potential to eliminate preventable harm due to 
health-related care.
Scholarship as a Competence in Patient Safety
It was only five years ago that the term “Patient Safety” was 
added to the medical subject headings (MeSH) vocabulary 
thesaurus, allowing for increased specificity in searching 
published literature through the U.S. National Library of 
Medicine.15 Safety science is still relatively new, building on the 
longstanding fields of ergonomics, human factors engineering, 
sociology, and anthropology to name a few. Applying the 
science of these fields to the complex and adaptive systems 
that comprise healthcare is neither intuitive nor direct. It 
requires not only a specialist knowledge of an individual 
field, but a generalist knowledge of complementary fields of 
study. Thus, as part of formal training and certification as 
professionals in the field, future practitioners in patient safety 
and quality must demonstrate the ability to work comfortably 
in a world of applied scholarship. By necessity, safety science 
often diverges from traditional science because frequently 
the problem at hand cannot be tested using hypothesis-
driven, randomized controlled trials; however, since we are 
talking about human behavior within complex systems, 
qualitative and quasi-experimental research designs are of 
great importance within improvement efforts. As suggested 
by Mannion and Braithwaite:
“If we want to achieve different results then we need to be 
less reverential towards the orthodox paradigm, get beyond 
simplistic system thinking, expand our research horizons, 
and advance new and better ways for understanding and 
intervening in patient safety.”1
Transformation of the profession of patient safety as an 
independent research path will require more than just the 
change in our approach to study proposed by Mannion and 
Braithwaite (shifting focus from what goes wrong to also 
studying what is going right), but will also require a change in 
how we train future scholars. 
What is Next? Patient Safety as a Profession
Today, the role of a patient safety leader is often garnered 
through promotion, not through evidence of advanced 
training and application of knowledge to practice. Every 
health profession today has built aspects of patient safety 
education, from its uniprofessional perspective, within 
the discipline’s curriculum. What is missing, however, is a 
recognized professional trained in the competencies of patient 
safety and quality to lead the patient safety agenda within 
organizations and systems. Ensuring that patient safety leaders 
become recognized, visible, and have the authority to lead the 
technical work of the profession of patient safety, requires that 
we come to consensus on that set of competencies to establish 
the profession of patient safety.
In order for us to reverse the apparently intractable state of 
patient safety and quality improvement, those disciplines 
drawn to the work, and the healthcare institutions employing 
them, must recognize patient safety and quality as a 
profession, “a calling requiring specialized knowledge and 
often long and intensive academic preparation.”16 In their 
1996 Technical Report, Ford and Gibbs describe “A Model 
of a Profession” and its accompanying infrastructure. The 
components of a profession include initial professional 
education, accreditation, skills development, certification 
or licensure, professional development, a code of ethics, 
and professional societies.17 Toward that end, nine graduate 
programs from leading universities in the United States 
and Canada have begun the process with the Commission 
on Accreditation of Healthcare Management Education 
(CAHME) to establish accreditation standards for graduate 
programs in patient safety and quality. One component of the 
standards is establishing the core competencies required for 
students graduating with a degree in patient safety and quality 
at the Master’s level.
Until the global community calls for and drives the adoption 
of fundamental principles and core competencies for the 
profession of patient safety and quality, our performance 
of Safety I and Safety II will fall short, perpetuating existing 
patient safety practices.
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